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Post by johnbryan on Dec 11, 2008 21:47:22 GMT -5
Okay, bear with me for a minute. Let's just say that MacArthur successfully pulls off his double retrograde manuver into Bataan, as he historically did, with all of his troops, equipment, but not enough food. After the first major Japanese attack on Bataan that drives the Filippino-American forces partially down the peninsula, MacArthur mounts a blitzkrieg style attack and counterattacks using the two main north/south running roads with all of his armor, anti-tank gun mounted half tracks, support vehicles and troops under a friendly artillery barrage from his still sizable number of artillery pieces. Hindsight being 20-20, we now know that the Japanese never outnumbered the Filippino-American forces on Bataan during the campaign, something that the USAFFE forces never knew.
Let's say that MacArthur's mobile armored forces break through and gets well into General Homma's rear, cutting off the main Japanese Army from any support behind them. How much death and destruction could they mete out? Could the USAFFE Forces catch Homma's forces in a pincer movement, crush them and turn the tables temporarily on the Japanese?
Granted, given the time frame, there were only a few dozen P-40 and P-35 fighterplanes left in his air force, but they might have kept Japanese air support at bay. Also, considering Bataan's double canopy forests, how much would that have limited the effectiveness of a USAFFE counterattack?
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Post by VeeVee on Dec 12, 2008 11:20:10 GMT -5
Assuming the time frame of your scenario takes place after the Battle of the Pockets and the Points, several factors would have greatly worked against such a move: (using 20-20 hindsight myself)
- Assuming Japanese reinforcements couldn't be brought in fast enough, Japanese air support could. They could easily wreak havoc on a USAFFE counterattack. Only the central and lower half of Bataan had double canopy forests. The SPM's and tanks would have had to take the main roads. They'd be sitting ducks to Japanese air support
- USAFFE artillery could only reach so far. If a counterattack advanced north far enough, they'd have to be brought in closer to the action which would make them vulnerable to air attacks again. Also the I Corp lost most of its artillery when they retreated to the second line. They may not have enough to support a push on the west side.
- The Philippine Division which was the bulk of the troops that were trained enough to conduct coordinated offensive maneuvers already tried a counter-attack to restore the Abucay line, and they failed. The ample artillery support that was available were ineffective because of the terrain and lack of accurate maps and communications. They had counter-attacked at a time when they were still strong and had relatively few casualties and still failed. A counter-attack after the battle of the Pockets and Points wouldn't have been promising. They were already weakened and suffered heavy casualties from those battles.
Their situation simply stunk. Not a whole lot of options. They were stuck between a rock and a hard place.
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Post by oklahoma on Dec 12, 2008 12:47:30 GMT -5
hey vic...i have to agree. even if the USAFFE forces achieved minor or even moderate success and even driven the japanese forces back into the layac or even san fernando regions our guys could never have held these gains. none of the men/materiel,etc expended on such a venture could have been replenished. in all probability we would have been forced back into the peninsula and the end result would have been the same. it might have extended the campaign a very few weeks or it might have hastened the end. at any rate, methinks it would have been futile although some victories would surely have raised the morale of the home folks. it would have been great to get in a few good licks of our own before the final defeat. in the end general king would still have had to make his trek to the surrender table.
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Post by clarkfield on Dec 13, 2008 7:57:17 GMT -5
I'm late to the game. I agree with most of the above comments. It reminds me, whenever I read a book by an historian or a survivor about Bataan, I'm always hoping for a different outcome.
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Post by oklahoma on Dec 13, 2008 17:03:32 GMT -5
hey clark...my sentiments exactly. like you, when i read a book about these tragic days of early world war II i am hoping for (examples follow)...the air defense filter center in hawaii puts importance on the report from the radar operators on the north shore of oahu, the powers that be at pearl harbor to put credence in the USS Ward's report on sinking a jap sub off the mouth of the channel to the base and that we would have had fighter cover over clark field during the refueling, etc on dec 8, 1941. i would imagine, on the other side of the coin, that a japanese reader wishes that admiral nagumo hadnt decided to rearm his planes at midway allowing the us navy to take out 3 fleet carriers at once and a 4th one later and that admiral kurita hadnt turned back north at leyte after his running fight with the jeep carriers. i am also sure that continually pondering this kind of stuff will be my demise, but we history buffs cant seem to get enough, it appears.
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Post by johnbryan on Dec 13, 2008 21:31:56 GMT -5
By the time in question, the Japanese 5th Air Group and all Japanese Naval aircraft had already been withdrawn to other theatres of war and the number of opposing fighter plane aircraft was roughly equal. A better time for a USAFFE armored offensive would never again have so many possibilities for success.
Homma's troops were suffering from the same cerebral malaria, dengue fever, beri-beri, dysentary and other diseases that the Filippino-Americans were. A concentrated armored infantry attack on two fronts may have borne rich fruit for the Allies, although it would have only been a temporary victory if at
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Post by rickthelibrarian on Jan 16, 2009 20:10:44 GMT -5
I do remember reading that at one point, the Japanese were afraid the Filipino/American forces would have learned how weak they were at one point.
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Post by oklahoma on Jan 17, 2009 11:45:27 GMT -5
in general agreement with most of the above. even if a fil/amer counter attack had been, at least, a temporary sucess, methinks it could never have been sustained. earlier in the war there was a pretty good chance that wake island could have been relieved, but even if that had been achieved, the japanese would have returned with whatever it would have taken to run us off the island and maybe even knocking out our precious carriers. i gotta think that macarthur playing it pretty close to his vest was the proper course. we were just trying to buy time till reinforcements could arrive. i say again, the whole early 1942 campaign was much like a greek tragedy. we didnt have the chance of a snowball in hades. i will also say again, that it would have been great to get "a time at bat" though, before the japs forced our capitulation. drawing some jap blood, just as did the tokyo raid by doolittle, would have been so welcomed by the people back home. we were desperate for some good news and kicking a little japanese rearend on bataan would have felt sooo good at the time. i was just a kid in elementary school and i remember well the news of genl doolittle and his B-25s bombing the japanese homeland and the teachers, kids and all present that day at school went literally crazy with joy. i am sure that news of some headknocking on bataan would have been received in similar fashion.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 6, 2009 20:55:25 GMT -5
I picked this up from another site and the information proves conclusively that MacArthur's Army had not completed that vitally important change between a peacetime and a wartime army. A smooth running, chain of command had not yet been established and far too many inferior, peacetime, officers were still in positions of power. A serious, major USAFFE Counterattack, using the combined arms was clearly out of the question and impossible until after all of these other problems had been "ironed out." www.historynet.com/battle-of-bataan-brigadier-general-clyde-a-selleck-commands-the-layac-line.htm
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 7, 2009 13:49:02 GMT -5
with the advantage of hindsight, it does seem quite extraordinary that the very least experienced commander, however well qualified on paper, was placed in command at the crucial point in this holding action. quite a few details were overlooked,etc, but when we realize that vice president harry truman didnt even know about the development of the atomic bomb till FDR died, something like the miscues in preparing for action at layac seem explainable regardless of how unjustified they were, (or do they? ). the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing doesnt seem to be limited to particular levels of command. from the white house to the culo river they seem to be a fact of military life.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 23, 2009 23:06:37 GMT -5
All too true and more's the pity!
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