|
Post by VeeVee on Dec 8, 2008 16:46:47 GMT -5
|
|
cco23i
History Student
"But I don't wanna go back to the States"
Posts: 94
|
Post by cco23i on Dec 9, 2008 16:21:38 GMT -5
Yup, going to have to get that one!
Scott
|
|
|
Post by oklahoma on Dec 10, 2008 12:06:18 GMT -5
i have to get me a copy. dont know how i have missed it. maybe it will clear up, at least in my mind, how such a blunder (catching so many US planes on the ground) could have happened. macarthur might have been on sound footing in not sending the B-17s to formosa, but for another reason. the zero fighters probably would have eaten our bomber formations up. i think there would have been considerably more "colin kelly" incidents had we gone north to the japanese jumping off points at formosa. having said this, the fortresses at clark still should have been airborne or down at del monte. i realize that refueling has to take place, but it should have been in echelons/staggered,etc. as i have always understood it, the air corps all came in to refuel and have chow at the same time. we had enough fighers to have had air cover at all times during those hectic early hours. i suppose that a peacetime attitude prevailed and it took some type disaster, such as the clark field bombing, to make us realize that we were now playing for keeps. will definitely grab up a copy of this book.
|
|
|
Post by VeeVee on Dec 12, 2008 22:41:08 GMT -5
Another book that has good Pacific Air Corps history is the Rugged, Ragged Warriors. pinoyhistory.proboards22.com/index.cgi?board=books&action=display&thread=327I think that's where I read that even if the B17's weren't caught on the ground in Clark, apparently many of them were at Del Monte field. Some were under repair. So significantly less than the 35 B17's would have been able to participate in a Formosa bombing. Most of them would probably have been shot down by a hundred intercepting zeros. Just the same it would have been nice if they were able to dish some hurt out instead of getting destroyed on the ground.
|
|
|
Post by oklahoma on Dec 13, 2008 17:34:58 GMT -5
hey vic....the way i understand the situation was that one half the strength (17 ) B-17s were down at del monte. i dont remember (and am too lazy to check it out) whether brereton or macarthur was the one responsible for dispersment of half the group south, but we at least had that much foresight. on the possible raid on formosa, i gotta believe that the zeros would have had a field day. those fortresses were the C model, no tail gunner nor ball turret. two .50 cal. guns in the waist positions and the double gun turret aft of the cockpit and single .30 cal. in the nose and one in the radio compartment. the B-17 type sent over germany in later years (the E and F models) were armed to the teeth and still suffered heavy losses from me-109s and fw 190s before dropping their loads. i just gotta believe the zero fighters based at formosa would have had a birds nest on the ground. this "dropping one in a pickle barrel" dogma that the army air corps believed at the time wouldnt have cut the mustard at that juncture. like you said though, it would have been great to have had a "time at bat", but i just have to believe that such a raid would have been a disaster. P-51 mustang fighter escort would have alleviated some problems, but , alas, mustangs were a gleam in some designers eye at that time. i may be in error as to some of the details in the armament on those C models, but i believe i have it correct in the general sense. i just cant forget the newsreel shots of our later model fortresses, which were armed in ever conceivable manner, still being unable to completely forestall concentrated and determined luftwaffe attacks. my views, however, arent set in concrete. always open to differing views from other posters. thats what i like about this board (also the corregidor site). nice visiting again.
|
|
|
Post by stenotholus on Dec 21, 2008 10:10:49 GMT -5
Bartsch's Dec 8 is excellent and essential for anyone who wants to understand the war in the Philippines. (To my mind its most valuable contribution is its explanation of why the big US military buildup occurred in the first place.)
One of the myths Bartsch explodes is that an attacking force of B-17s would have been decimated by defending Zeros. The fact is there were no Zeros available for defense. Every one was committed to offensive operations. On Dec 8 the entire air defense of Formosa consisted of 24 Type 96 carrier fighters and a few Type 97 army fighters. Fighters with two .30 cal guns would have been ineffectual against even early model B-17s and its quite possible that an attacking US force would have escaped w/o loss. That doesn't mean a raid would have been a success, hitting the fog-enshrouded airfields would have been very difficult, but recognition that the Japanese had completely ignored airfield defense does make the what ifs more interesting.
|
|
|
Post by oklahoma on Dec 21, 2008 14:44:02 GMT -5
hey sten...really good stuff. i have to read this book post haste. under this new senario things could have been interesting, unless the fortress formation had encountered the zeros as they were outbound or were returning from the "offensive" operations. anyhow, if we could have hit those airfields with no fog conditions the timetable could have been seriously hampered, but methinks the inevitable outcome would have been the same, only maybe a few weeks later. as i have said in previous postings, the whole 1941-42 campaign was like a greek tragedy. murphy's law compounded, everything that could go wrong, did go wrong.
|
|
|
Post by johnbryan on Mar 1, 2009 22:33:14 GMT -5
Another book that has good Pacific Air Corps history is the Rugged, Ragged Warriors. pinoyhistory.proboards22.com/index.cgi?board=books&action=display&thread=327I think that's where I read that even if the B17's weren't caught on the ground in Clark, apparently many of them were at Del Monte field. Some were under repair. So significantly less than the 35 B17's would have been able to participate in a Formosa bombing. Most of them would probably have been shot down by a hundred intercepting zeros. Just the same it would have been nice if they were able to dish some hurt out instead of getting destroyed on the ground. Agreed. The numbers of aircraft then undergoing repair at that time is correct, because then as now, it is all too common to have 1/4 of your aircraft in the shop undergoing maintanence and repair at any given date. It is indeed a dirty shame that those B-17's never got the opportunity to prove their true worth by bombing the airfields on Formosa. A single successful raid like this could have had far reaching consequences.
|
|
|
Post by VeeVee on Mar 11, 2009 9:48:58 GMT -5
Here's an excerpt from another book about the prewar air corps in the Philippines (Bataan: The Judgment Seat)... I'll make a new thread for it later but I thought this excerpt is rather telling on the air corps situation before and at the outset of war. From: www.archive.org/stream/bataanthejudgmen010770mbp/bataanthejudgmen010770mbp_djvu.txtGeneral Claggett and Colonel George were still absent in China. They would be back shortly. So it was that Colonel Richards became host to our Singapore visitor, Group Captain Charles Darvel. And a plane put at his disposal made it possible for him to accomplish a quick tour of Luzon, with particular reference to the airfields. The evening of a boiling night early in June found Darvel in the middle of the group of officers called by Colonel Richards to hear his comments. Over his shoulder I could dimly see the river boats through the open windows of old Fort Santiago. At the moment, the interisland boat Panay was moving silently up the Pasig to her berth. She was one of the largest of the interisland fleet and was to play a role in the sinister months to come. "You will understand, I am sure," Captain Darvel began, "if I say that it is my belief that a sudden determined enemy attack would reduce the effectiveness of your present air force practically to zero." That sensation I had experienced before and was to experience so many times later a little hot, Bghminglike tingle along my spine punctuated his sentences. I am sure there were several in that group who had no illusions, but these words seemed to snap home like machine-gun bullets. Sitting almost in front of me was Major K. J. K. Gregg, then leader of the ijth Pursuit Squadron. His brown eyes narrowed. He was thinking intently, and the long bony finger that tapped the ash off his cigarette was as steady as a piece of wood. I was to see that man so many times while Japanese bombs smashed around us and, then as now, that steady finger. But he never betrayed any feeling, any evidence of what might have been disturbing the inner man. Blond-haired Major R. A. Grussendorf, Group Operations Officer at Nichols Field, stared hard at the smooth shiny concrete floor, reflecting pools of light from the dangling electrics. Colonel Churchill watched the spiral smoke from his cigarette, his face immobile. Another whose name was to be indelibly written in the history of Bataan was in that circle. He was Major O. L. Grover, Squadron Leader of the 2oth Pursuit, Nichols Field. His quick brain took in those words, weighed them, classified them, and did not find them wanting. Grover's restless eyes saw far more than the objects immediately before them. He knew that Group Captain Darvel spoke the truth, and his application of the principles of dispersal was largely responsible for the preservation of the pursuit units which survived the first shattering blows at Clark Field on December 8. "You must have more airfields. As I see it at this time, you have only two fields upon which you are certain of being able to operate Army bombers and service them. Likewise, there are only two capable of handling fast modern fighters, and one of these is Nichols . . ." His voice trailed off, then again that quick smile. "Well, one can't be tactful and truthful at the same moment in this regard Nichols is dubious, to say the least. You must have alternate airfields to which harassed airplanes can run for servicing and get out into the air again. You must have dispersal of your repair facilities one serious raid may cripple your entire supply, because, as I see it, practically everything is centered in the Philippine Air Depot, in buildings which present perfect targets from the air, and which would become flaming ruins in no time at all." He stopped. It was obvious he did not wish to offend. It was quite obvious he was appalled by our vulnerability. We shifted. The heat was truly Suffocating. We knew he spoke the truth, and certainly no part of his statement was truer than the last. Right now, most of us were more concerned about terminating the interview and escaping the suffocating air of Fort Santiago than anything else that could be mentioned. After all, we were trying, and just how we were going to accomplish the appearance of alternate airfields, of dispersal hangars, of underground fuel and bomb dumps, of pens to protect aircraft against blast and all overnight, as it were, well . . . Reading our thoughts, Group Captain Darvel said: "Yes, I know it is most difficult. In Malaya, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham says, We will do the difficult things first the impossible may take rather longer. "
|
|
|
Post by ibarramedia on Mar 21, 2009 22:11:26 GMT -5
That is a good book to get. Another Pearl Harbor book that is excellent is At Dawn we Slept by Gordon W. Prange.
|
|
av8tor
History Buff
Posts: 125
|
Post by av8tor on Mar 23, 2009 19:43:11 GMT -5
Hi Ibarramedia,
I see that you are in Silver Sprind MD. Are you into reenacting? I got a small group (but growing) here in Virginia with another member Milspec. We just got our M1 Garands from the CMP and also have a browning 1919A4. We're going to have some activities in the coming months. Pls contact me. - Don
|
|
|
Post by VeeVee on Sept 9, 2018 10:18:44 GMT -5
|
|