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Post by oklahoma on May 25, 2009 10:44:31 GMT -5
hey john....i found the thread pertaining to juanita redmond. its on this site, "Books and suggested readings". thread...".Lt juanita redmond, i served on bataan". i read the book, in installments as an eleven year old kid back in 1943. it appeared in the now defunct magazine "Liberty". just a short time later the first inklings of the "bataan death march" began to trickle out of the philippines and the folks back home really began to worry about the prisoners, especially the nurses and what fate befell them. as it turned out, by japanese standards, they didnt fair too badly. no walk in the park or piece of cake, but aside from lean rations,etc everybody made it out o.k. to everybody's delight and surprise.
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Post by johnbryan on May 25, 2009 15:34:40 GMT -5
Thanks Oklahoma! She was a pretty lady!
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Post by johnbryan on May 25, 2009 22:53:30 GMT -5
Once again I say, Imagine what could have happened had those three huge V-boat submarines, Nautilus, Narwhal and Argonaught been used to ferry supplies from Cebu to Corregidor? I'm not sure of the distance between Cebu to Luzon, but I would imagine that it would be much closer than that to Brisbane, Australia to Luzon and those submarines could make the voyage in only a few days. If they left their torpedoes behind on Cebu, they could carry alot more than 100 tons of badly needed supplies on a single blockade running mission. The subs would also be alot safer than the freighters that were tasked with running the Japanese blockade because of their ability to submerge. What's more is that the turn around time would be minimal and the next trip could be quickly repeated in a matter of days. In any event, the submarine resupply efforts couldn't continue after 10 April, 1942, because that's when the Japanese occupied Cebu. In the interim, if I were to make an educated guess, I would say that those three submarines could have hauled enough food, medicine and ordinance supplies to stave off defeat on Luzon for several additional weeks past the actual Bataan surrender date, sometime after the end of April, 1942. In the end, it wasn't the Japanese that beat the Filippino-American forces in the Philippines. It was a combination of disease and slow starvation that did the awful deed. |
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Post by oklahoma on May 26, 2009 9:23:09 GMT -5
hey john....gotta agree. the capacity and will to fight drops dramatically when troops are literally starving and suffering from various diseases. i often wonder how things would have been different had we moved just a portion of the rice stocks stored at cabanatuan to bataan prior to setting up a MLR at abucay. troops with full bellies, even if it was strictly a rice based diet, could have held out for a much longer period of time, thus throwing the jap time table off even more than they did. i dont pretend to know what quanity of medical supplies and equipment was available for hoarding on the peninsula, but well fed soldiers arent as likely to fall victim to various ailments as are starving troops. all this is just another "what if". i dont think i am far off the mark when i say that the bataan/corregidor campaign had more than their share of "what ifs". from the first day, what could go wrong did go wrong. " murphys law" compounded for those unfortunate guys.
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Post by rickthelibrarian on May 26, 2009 13:14:56 GMT -5
Unddrbrink's book (mentioned above) discusses the attempts to move food and other supplys to and from Cebu.
I have an autographed copy of Juanita Redmond's book "I Served on Bataan", which I picked up in a used bookstore over 40 years ago.
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Post by johnbryan on May 27, 2009 14:41:54 GMT -5
hey john....gotta agree. the capacity and will to fight drops dramatically when troops are literally starving and suffering from various diseases. i often wonder how things would have been different had we moved just a portion of the rice stocks stored at cabanatuan to bataan prior to setting up a MLR at abucay. troops with full bellies, even if it was strictly a rice based diet, could have held out for a much longer period of time, thus throwing the jap time table off even more than they did. i dont pretend to know what quanity of medical supplies and equipment was available for hoarding on the peninsula, but well fed soldiers arent as likely to fall victim to various ailments as are starving troops. all this is just another "what if". i dont think i am far off the mark when i say that the bataan/corregidor campaign had more than their share of "what ifs". from the first day, what could go wrong did go wrong. " murphys law" compounded for those unfortunate guys. Oklahoma, I know exactly what you mean about "Murphy's Law" playing such an important role in the Fil-American defeat in the PI. I think alot of it stemmed from the old, "Puka-Sahib" colonial mentality that alot of the officers and men served and labored under. Service in the Philippines in the late 30's-early 40's was a sweet, plum assignment for anyone in the Army, just as being a "China Marine" was for the men of the 4th Marine Regiment at Shanghai and Tientsin. You got your work duties completed before Noon and then, spent the remainder of the day staying out of the sun's harsh rays. It must have been an idylic life for the military men stationed there, easy duty, plenty of good beer, cheap booze and drop-dead, beautiful women to become involved with. Everything that an American male could ever want and all in a veritable "Heaven on earth, Garden of Eden existance." The problem seems to have been the US Military's inability to shake itself from its usual mode and mentality of peacetime complacency, until far too many mistakes had been committed and it was far too late, timewise to correct them. Many of the peacetime methods of doing things in the military have no place during wartime and doing things by "the book" often quickly goes right out the window. Another problem seems to have been that a fairly large percentage of US Army Officers were plainly not up to the tasks asked of their grade of rank and they failed miserably during battle. I want to reach back 68 years and give MacArthur a good shake after he receives his first "War Warning" from Washington DC in mid-1941, telling him to put the PI on a full, wartime footing, to get everyone out of the barracks and into the field for intensive, "toughening up" training on a 24/7 basis. I would order war games on a bi-weekly basis from the quartermasters moving supplies around, to the dogface soljer' in the field, to the Army Air Corps pilots in the air, putting much needed flight time hours in their aircraft, practicing their trade. Perhaps had the officers and men of the USAFFE Forces been forcibly broken out of their peacetime mold, while getting lean and mean, and adopting a warrior mentality, maybe Mr Murphy would have been a little kinder towards them after 8 December, 1941. |
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Post by johnbryan on May 27, 2009 23:25:55 GMT -5
hey john....gotta agree. the capacity and will to fight drops dramatically when troops are literally starving and suffering from various diseases. i often wonder how things would have been different had we moved just a portion of the rice stocks stored at cabanatuan to bataan prior to setting up a MLR at abucay. troops with full bellies, even if it was strictly a rice based diet, could have held out for a much longer period of time, thus throwing the jap time table off even more than they did. i dont pretend to know what quanity of medical supplies and equipment was available for hoarding on the peninsula, but well fed soldiers arent as likely to fall victim to various ailments as are starving troops. all this is just another "what if". i dont think i am far off the mark when i say that the bataan/corregidor campaign had more than their share of "what ifs". from the first day, what could go wrong did go wrong. " murphys law" compounded for those unfortunate guys. Oklahoma, I know exactly what you mean about "Murphy's Law" playing such an important role in the Fil-American defeat in the PI. I think alot of it stemmed from the old, "Puka-Sahib" colonial mentality that alot of the officers and men served and labored under. Service in the Philippines in the late 30's-early 40's was a sweet, plum assignment for anyone in the Army, just as being a "China Marine" was for the men of the 4th Marine Regiment at Shanghai and Tientsin. You got your work duties completed before Noon and then, spent the remainder of the day staying out of the sun's harsh rays. It must have been an idylic life for the military men stationed there, easy duty, plenty of good beer, cheap booze and drop-dead, beautiful women to become involved with. Everything that an American male could ever want and all in a veritable "Heaven on earth, Garden of Eden existance." The problem seems to have been the US Military's inability to shake itself from its usual mode and mentality of peacetime complacency, until far too many mistakes had been committed and it was far too late, timewise to correct them. Many of the peacetime methods of doing things in the military have no place during wartime and doing things by "the book" often quickly goes right out the window. Another problem seems to have been that a fairly large percentage of US Army Officers were plainly not up to the tasks asked of their grade of rank and they failed miserably during battle. I want to reach back 68 years and give MacArthur a good shake after he receives his first "War Warning" from Washington DC in mid-1941, telling him to put the PI on a full, wartime footing, to get everyone out of the barracks and into the field for intensive, "toughening up" training on a 24/7 basis. I would order war games on a bi-weekly basis from the quartermasters moving supplies around, to the dogface soljer' in the field, to the Army Air Corps pilots in the air, putting much needed flight time hours in their aircraft, practicing their trade. Perhaps had the officers and men of the USAFFE Forces been forcibly broken out of their peacetime mold, while getting lean and mean, and adopting a warrior mentality, maybe Mr Murphy would have been a little kinder towards them after 8 December, 1941. Of course, the prompt delivery of the supplies from the Pensacola Convoy wouldn't hurt either.. ;D |
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Post by johnbryan on Jun 1, 2009 19:57:12 GMT -5
Oklahoma, I know exactly what you mean about "Murphy's Law" playing such an important role in the Fil-American defeat in the PI. I think alot of it stemmed from the old, "Puka-Sahib" colonial mentality that alot of the officers and men served and labored under. Service in the Philippines in the late 30's-early 40's was a sweet, plum assignment for anyone in the Army, just as being a "China Marine" was for the men of the 4th Marine Regiment at Shanghai and Tientsin. You got your work duties completed before Noon and then, spent the remainder of the day staying out of the sun's harsh rays. It must have been an idylic life for the military men stationed there, easy duty, plenty of good beer, cheap booze and drop-dead, beautiful women to become involved with. Everything that an American male could ever want and all in a veritable "Heaven on earth, Garden of Eden existance."
The problem seems to have been the US Military's inability to shake itself from its usual mode and mentality of peacetime complacency, until far too many mistakes had been committed and it was far too late, timewise to correct them. Many of the peacetime methods of doing things in the military have no place during wartime and doing things by "the book" often quickly goes right out the window. Another problem seems to have been that a fairly large percentage of US Army Officers were plainly not up to the tasks asked of their grade of rank and they failed miserably during battle.
I want to reach back 68 years and give MacArthur a good shake after he receives his first "War Warning" from Washington DC in mid-1941, telling him to put the PI on a full, wartime footing, to get everyone out of the barracks and into the field for intensive, "toughening up" training on a 24/7 basis. I would order war games on a bi-weekly basis from the quartermasters moving supplies around, to the dogface soljer' in the field, to the Army Air Corps pilots in the air, putting much needed flight time hours in their aircraft, practicing their trade.
Perhaps had the officers and men of the USAFFE Forces been forcibly broken out of their peacetime mold, while getting lean and mean, and adopting a warrior mentality, maybe Mr Murphy would have been a little kinder towards them after 8 December 1941.
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Post by johnbryan on Jun 1, 2009 19:58:50 GMT -5
Oklahoma, I know exactly what you mean about "Murphy's Law" playing such an important role in the Fil-American defeat in the PI. I think alot of it stemmed from the old, "Puka-Sahib" colonial mentality that alot of the officers and men served and labored under. Service in the Philippines in the late 30's-early 40's was a sweet, plum assignment for anyone in the Army, just as being a "China Marine" was for the men of the 4th Marine Regiment at Shanghai and Tientsin. You got your work duties completed before Noon and then, spent the remainder of the day staying out of the sun's harsh rays. It must have been an idylic life for the military men stationed there, easy duty, plenty of good beer, cheap booze and drop-dead, beautiful women to become involved with. Everything that an American male could ever want and all in a veritable "Heaven on earth, Garden of Eden existance." The problem seems to have been the US Military's inability to shake itself from its usual mode and mentality of peacetime complacency, until far too many mistakes had been committed and it was far too late, timewise to correct them. Many of the peacetime methods of doing things in the military have no place during wartime and doing things by "the book" often quickly goes right out the window. Another problem seems to have been that a fairly large percentage of US Army Officers were plainly not up to the tasks asked of their grade of rank and they failed miserably during battle. I want to reach back 68 years and give MacArthur a good shake after he receives his first "War Warning" from Washington DC in mid-1941, telling him to put the PI on a full, wartime footing, to get everyone out of the barracks and into the field for intensive, "toughening up" training on a 24/7 basis. I would order war games on a bi-weekly basis from the quartermasters moving supplies around, to the dogface soljer' in the field, to the Army Air Corps pilots in the air, putting much needed flight time hours in their aircraft, practicing their trade. Perhaps had the officers and men of the USAFFE Forces been forcibly broken out of their peacetime mold, while getting lean and mean, and adopting a warrior mentality, maybe Mr Murphy would have been a little kinder towards them after 8 December 1941. Of course, the prompt delivery of the supplies from the Pensacola Convoy wouldn't hurt either.. |
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Post by oklahoma on Jun 4, 2009 17:07:06 GMT -5
hey john....getting anti-freeze out to the PI for the piston engine P-40s in order to give the pilots many more hours of familiarization with the "new" fighter would have helped to some degree. our guys might have matched up with saburo sakai and the other zero pilots in a bit better fashion. we can hang this foulup on some stateside ordnance officer i suppose. i have read somewhere that the reason this happened was that somebody in authority actually thought that you didnt need antifreeze in the tropics so there was no priority placed on the stuff. can you imagine something like this happening??? what monumental ignorance and incompetence if actually a fact. the list is endless and with harry truman's 20-20 hindsight it is maddening to contemplate.
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Post by johnbryan on Jun 5, 2009 23:51:07 GMT -5
From what I've gathered from books written back in the day, they didn't refer to it as "anti-freeze". It was always called "Prestone Coolant." I'm not sure if that would have mattered or not.
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Post by oklahoma on Jun 6, 2009 9:53:44 GMT -5
hey john....hadnt thought of it in that manner, but i just assumed that it worked just like the stuff i pour in my chevy radiator. keeps it from freezing in the winter and keeps her cool in the summer. i am certainly not an aviation engine mech, but a piston engine is a piston engine (i think?  ). you must underestand that my mechanical aptitude is limited to putting air in an automobile tire. i even manage to do a little cussing in this endeavor. lol. |
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Post by johnbryan on Jun 6, 2009 17:43:43 GMT -5
Oklahoma, it is the same stuff that you pour in your chevy radiator..:  Back then, it was called Prestone coolant. |
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Post by plane mech on Jun 6, 2009 17:45:09 GMT -5
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Post by johnbryan on Jun 6, 2009 17:46:28 GMT -5
Yup, that's the stuff.
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Post by ibarramedia on Jun 9, 2009 17:41:46 GMT -5
Coolant and Anit freeze are synonymous and interchangeable.
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). you must underestand that my mechanical aptitude is limited to putting air in an automobile tire. i even manage to do a little cussing in this endeavor. lol.
Back then, it was called Prestone coolant.