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Post by johnbryan on Feb 6, 2009 20:37:28 GMT -5
What if the Japanese invasion attempt of Corregidor had failed and was hurled back into the sea, as it almost was? How long could the Filippino-American forces have hold out? Remember, the vast majority of the Japanese landing craft had already been destroyed by Corregidor's artillery. How soon before General Homma would have mounted a second invasion attempt?
I read of an account where General Wainright was telling another officer that there was food enough to last Corregidor's garrison until the end of June, given its present half-ration status.
What say you ladies and gentlemen?
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 7, 2009 14:08:57 GMT -5
seems to me that i read somewhere that the supply of fuel for the water well pumps was running low. something like a week or ten day supply remained. i know absolutely nothing about the possibility of purification of sea water. whether corregidor had this capability or not would make my fuel for the water pumps speculation moot. i am sure somebody out there knows more on this particular factor of the corregidor saga. it is intriguing, though, how long the fortress might have held out had the jap landing attempt been repulsed. some military historians think that maybe we did throw in the towel too soon. "tanks on the island" did, i am sure, have an alarming effect on genl wainright and color his thinking. maybe, just maybe, if he had known that there were only three tanks that he might have somehow knocked them out. i realize that there were no anti tank weapons, but if the tracks were knocked off by some means (land mines, if available, dynamite charges, etc) then the playing field would be leveled somewhat and we would have been able to prolong our misery for a time. all this is, or course, speculation, but at this very late date, it does no harm. i keep fantasizing that as skinny wainwright decides to go meet with genl houma that the USS enterprise and an accompanying task force steams in from the west coast just in the nick of time and we have a truly hollywood finish. same way when i read about the battle of the little big horn and pearl harbor. a last minute rescue saves the day. aint the human mind fantastic? nice talking to you.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 23, 2009 23:03:46 GMT -5
Wainwright was heard to say, near the end of the siege that his quartermaster had assured him that there was food enough on Corregidor to last them at their current ration level until the end of June.
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Post by VeeVee on Feb 24, 2009 4:59:05 GMT -5
If some of the Coast Artillery crew members topside who were also trained infantrymen could have shifted and assisted the marines at the tail of the island, the invasion could have been beaten back. Of course I'd hate to think what retaliation the Japanese would have inflicted when they eventually capture the island after being beaten back the first time. Loss of face drove them mad.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 25, 2009 23:14:31 GMT -5
If some of the Coast Artillery crew members topside who were also trained infantrymen could have shifted and assisted the marines at the tail of the island, the invasion could have been beaten back. Of course I'd hate to think what retaliation the Japanese would have inflicted when they eventually capture the island after being beaten back the first time. Loss of face drove them mad. I read a number of official accounts on the Corregidor site that stated that a number of the coastal artillery crews were ordered to abandon their gun batteries and sent to beat back the Japanese attack. Wainwright should have also sent more of the marines who were sitting around behind their beach defense postions, around the island, to attack the Japanese as well.
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 26, 2009 20:04:53 GMT -5
hey john...the more i read about the final hours of resistance on corregidor the more i get the impression that genl wainwright might have thrown in the towel a bit soon. former lieutenant and ultimate light colonel ray lawrence seems to think that the defenders were in better shape than was known back in malinta tunnel. i read somewhere that never has a headquarters been so close to the actual fighting and known so little about the real situation on the ground. that alarming bit of info that reached skinny wainwright about "tanks being on the island" surely colored his decision to seek terms. although there were only three tanks it seemed, i am sure, at the time to be a catastrophic situation. i wont go into that again as i touched on it in a prior posting (that might have been on the corregidor website, but i am of the opinion the many of the same folks read both sites) i wont dwell on it anymore, at least for now. much the same thing happened on wake island. the USMC was mopping up on wilkes island, but major devereaux and commander cunningham were under the impression that the enemy was overrunning the whole garrison when this was, not in fact, true. anyhow, i gotta agree with vic, the end result was inevitable. in both senarios, both corregidor and wake were doomed and i suppose by western standards many american lives were saved in the long run by surrendering. no alamo or little bighorn was to happen in either instance. if we didnt give it our best shot, we still made a gallant effort. no point in having an iwo jima type finale. our guys would have ultimately had to throw in the towel or be slaughtered by a vengeful, determined enemy.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 26, 2009 20:50:12 GMT -5
hey john...the more i read about the final hours of resistance on corregidor the more i get the impression that genl wainwright might have thrown in the towel a bit soon. former lieutenant and ultimate light colonel ray lawrence seems to think that the defenders were in better shape than was known back in malinta tunnel. i read somewhere that never has a headquarters been so close to the actual fighting and known so little about the real situation on the ground. that alarming bit of info that reached skinny wainwright about "tanks being on the island" surely colored his decision to seek terms. although there were only three tanks it seemed, i am sure, at the time to be a catastrophic situation. i wont go into that again as i touched on it in a prior posting (that might have been on the corregidor website, but i am of the opinion the many of the same folks read both sites) i wont dwell on it anymore, at least for now. much the same thing happened on wake island. the USMC was mopping up on wilkes island, but colonel devereaux and commander cunningham were under the impression that the enemy was overrunning the whole garrison when this was, not in fact, true. anyhow, i gotta agree with vic, the end result was inevitable. in both senarios, both corregidor and wake were doomed and i suppose by western standards many american lives were saved in the long run by surrendering. no alamo or little bighorn was to happen in either instance. if we didnt give it our best shot, we still made a gallant effort. no point in having an iwo jima type finale. our guys would have ultimately had to throw in the towel or be slaughtered by a vengeful, determined enemy. Agreed on all points! I read the report stating, that when the US surrender came down, there were less than 500 unwounded Japanese troops on Corregidor, probably closer to 200. This would naturally lead one to believe that if one last American counterattack were made against the beach head, the Japanese would have been hurled back into Manila Bay and destroyed. Given the large number of Japanese landing craft destroyed (well over 50%) during the operation, it would be weeks before enough replacement landing craft could be assembled and another invasion landing be made. In both operations, it all came down to communications failure on Corregidor and Wake Island's. The severity of fighting tore up the communications wire and they were unable to replace it.
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 27, 2009 9:28:21 GMT -5
hey john....didnt genl homma actually believe the landing attempt had failed????i have read somewhere that after viewing action reports coming in from his assault units that he was ready to concede failure and lo and behold he learns that white flags are being displayed by amer/fil defenders. another case of japanese perserverence overcoming a larger opposing force. same thing at singapore. the troops of the emperor just kept pounding away in a battle of wills even though they were facing an enemy superior in numbers. i can see where that these tactics could lead defenders to assume that they were facing overwhelming odds. again, that old hindsight thing holds true. as the war unfolded the allies adapted very nicely and did some pounding of their own, methinks.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 27, 2009 15:13:40 GMT -5
hey john....didnt genl homma actually believe the landing attempt had failed????i have read somewhere that after viewing action reports coming in from his assault units that he was ready to concede failure and lo and behold he learns that white flags are being displayed by amer/fil defenders. another case of japanese perserverence overcoming a larger opposing force. same thing at singapore. the troops of the emperor just kept pounding away in a battle of wills even though they were facing an enemy superior in numbers. i can see where that these tactics could lead defenders to assume that they were facing overwhelming odds. again, that old hindsight thing holds true. as the war unfolded the allies adapted very nicely and did some pounding of their own, methinks. Hi Oklahoma! Some accounts that I've read have stated that General Homma was on the verge of complete despair and a total nervous breakdown, because of the incredibly high casualty numbers and losses of landing craft that were suffered by the Japanese during the landings and subsequent battle. A few more hours of mounting American resistance and Homma might very well have committed hari-kiri in disgrace.
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 27, 2009 16:24:58 GMT -5
hey john....well if genl homma had slit his wrists or whatever, the amer/fil folks would have derived at least that much satisfaction from the situation. i hate to imagine what the incoming japanese commander would have allowed his ultimately victorious troops to get away with in the attempt to regain "face". nanking comes to mind all to readily. in that case it might have been better for the corregidor people to have fought to the last man. as you so aptly stated, with our famous hindsight advantage it is now obvious that by sheer force of numbers the defenders could have just pushed the much smaller landing force into the waters of manila bay. i wonder just how many troops were actually hunkered down on top side at various batteries and other venues (the south side beaches and cliffs) who could have been used against the invaders. i realize that some of these participants were sent to fight as infantry thru malinta tunnel with the highest company designations (not your usual A,B,C,etc, but letters such as M,N,O,P,etc of the provisional/composite regiment) as you ever would see in a combat situation. as both you and vic have said they were "cannon crankers" for the most part (some navy and quartermaster,etc) but i would think that 90 percent of them were qualified enough with the .03 or garand to make the difference. just the tremendous number of defenders as opposed to the remaining japanese should have made for an allied victory, no matter how short lived. the fact remains, we were defeated although, as i have mentioned before, i keep hoping that the USS Enterprise task force would come roaring in from the south china sea for a real hollywood finish. keep the faith.
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Post by insurrectomad on Feb 28, 2009 9:29:06 GMT -5
the Brits had better odds in Singapore, but put up a very poor show. In the Philippines it is likely that the GI's were of a similiar quality of men. Those of the Brits. Army in the 1930's who wanted a "cushy" life in the oriental sun were women and the cost of living was cheap volunteered to serve in "The Far East". those who looked to fight went to The Northwest Frontier (Afganistan). With the "Depression" driving workless many young men into the forces, it is easy to see that much of the Western forces were 2nd rate sunseekers. With a war in Europe advancing the best was kept at home to defend the "Homeland" & the best equipt. also. The French in Indo-China, The Dutch in Indonesia, & the Brits scattered across the eastern Empire from India-Burma, Malaya, & Hong Kong, crumbled before the Japanese. MacArthur spent more time at cocktail parties and golf than intensive prep. for a war. The Ack-Ack guns on Corridor lacked high-altertude shells. On top of this The US high command feared the Filipinos would change sides and welcome the Japs as Liberators. If only the Japanese had used this ploy on entering all the Western Imperial Colonies then Even the 'A' Bomb would not have defeated them I believe. Theirs was a bigger mistake than ours.
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 28, 2009 11:47:03 GMT -5
a lot of what you say makes much sense. hard economic times always drives many men into the armed forces. whether or not they make good soldiers probably is determined, for the most part, on the individual in my humble opinion. it is undoubtedly true that the u.s. was not ready for war, materially or pychologically, at home or in the far east. aint that always the case????one difference between the other western colonialists and america was that this country had set a definite date for granting independence to our asian colony and fulfilled that promise in a timely manner. the other imperialists paid the price with insurrection and calamity in one form or another. methinks, the philippines and united states will always have a bond that the other former colonial nations dont have with their former colonies. together the fil/american forces put up a pretty good fight under very difficult circumstances.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 1, 2009 17:26:48 GMT -5
a lot of what you say makes much sense. hard economic times always drives many men into the armed forces. whether or not they make good soldiers probably is determined, for the most part, on the individual in my humble opinion. it is undoubtedly true that the u.s. was not ready for war, materially or pychologically, at home or in the far east. aint that always the case????one difference between the other western colonialists and america was that this country had set a definite date for granting independence to our asian colony and fulfilled that promise in a timely manner. the other imperialists paid the price with insurrection and calamity in one form or another. methinks, the philippines and united states will always have a bond that the other former colonial nations dont have with their former colonies. together the fil/american forces put up a pretty good fight under very difficult circumstances. I would also humbly submit that a much more important factor, was the degree of realistic battle training that the average dog-face soldier received before ever firing a shot in anger, during wartime. Forewarned is forearmed and a pint of sweat lost on the practice field prevents a gallon of blood being lost on the battlefield.
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Post by oklahoma on Mar 1, 2009 21:55:37 GMT -5
hey john...you got that right. prior to the spring and summer of 1941 i would imagine that the regimen of our garrisons in the PI was mostly parade ground activities, inspections, ceremonial functions, etc. and evenings spent in what soldiers always do, hitting the bars, beer PX, gambling, etc with what little money they were paid. things didnt get serious till the war clouds arose in the spring of that fateful year. it was just that old "peacetime mentally" that isnt completely shaken until you can smell the cordite and see the blood, i.e, pearl harbor, clark field, cavite,etc. its been that way since war was invented, methinks. i am sure that you have read james jones' great novel "from here to eternity". even though it is fiction it still gives an excellent picture of the peace time army as events were building around them as war loomed. the book is fiction, as i said, but jones was at schofield barracks and the events he described surely were based on actual people and situations that he actually saw and experienced in an army that was just beginning to gear up for serious business. i just might read it again, now that i think about it.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 1, 2009 22:06:42 GMT -5
You'd have thought that after all the wives and dependants had been sent home, by official decree the year before, the US Army would have started taking things alot more seriously, in terms of training for the outbreak of war. I suppose that prejudice against the fighting abilities of the Japanese and their race and culture as a whole played a large role in the Fil-American troops not training for war at the proper level later proved necessary.
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Post by ibarramedia on Apr 11, 2009 0:56:12 GMT -5
If Corregidor had held out then the Japanese military would have a hard time transporting troops to the Philippines. To get to Manila, you have to pass by corregidor. The Silnad is a major obstacle to landing troops and and invasion force. Their timetable for occupying the Philippines would have been disrupted. This would be a major loss for the Japanese military and the defeat at Midway around this timeline would not look good for the Japanese.
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Post by johnbryan on Apr 11, 2009 15:44:17 GMT -5
Not necessarily. The Japanese could just as easily land their reinforcements at Subic Bay and bring them overland by railroad or truck into southern Bataan.
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Post by oklahoma on Apr 11, 2009 20:18:11 GMT -5
i have always liked to believe that bataan and corregidor holding out as long as they did may have tipped the balance at kokoda, down in new guinea, later that summer when the nips were driving toward port moresby. maybe if they had a battalion or two more (not asking for much) their goal might have been accomplished. instead several thousand of the enemy were, till may 1942, still slogging around up on bataan and corregidor, sick, diseased and generally worn out in their attempt to beat down the amer/fil defenders. capturing port moresby would have made macarthur,s turnaround of allied fortunes much more difficult. maybe this is just a romantic view. i know some scholars feel that our prolonged resistance didnt accomplish anything but bolster the morale of the folks at home. i still gotta believe that by tying down what japanese forces were being utilized in the philippines was just enough to make the kokoda defeat of imperial forces an under appreciated victory for the "good guys". just my opinion.
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Post by johnbryan on May 25, 2009 16:44:48 GMT -5
the Brits had better odds in Singapore, but put up a very poor show. In the Philippines it is likely that the GI's were of a similiar quality of men. Those of the Brits. Army in the 1930's who wanted a "cushy" life in the oriental sun were women and the cost of living was cheap volunteered to serve in "The Far East". those who looked to fight went to The Northwest Frontier (Afganistan). With the "Depression" driving workless many young men into the forces, it is easy to see that much of the Western forces were 2nd rate sunseekers. With a war in Europe advancing the best was kept at home to defend the "Homeland" & the best equipt. also. The French in Indo-China, The Dutch in Indonesia, & the Brits scattered across the eastern Empire from India-Burma, Malaya, & Hong Kong, crumbled before the Japanese. MacArthur spent more time at thingytail parties and golf than intensive prep. for a war. The Ack-Ack guns on Corridor lacked high-altertude shells. On top of this The US high command feared the Filipinos would change sides and welcome the Japs as Liberators. If only the Japanese had used this ploy on entering all the Western Imperial Colonies then Even the 'A' Bomb would not have defeated them I believe. Theirs was a bigger mistake than ours. I would agree with you about some of what you said, but General MacArthur really didn't have any choice about how he could prepare his troops for action should the Japanese attack, because he had none of the wherewithal and money needed to pursue that course. Until the Spring of 1941, the US Congress acted as if the Philippine Islands didn't exist. Afterwards was a wholly different matter, in that, the US tried to make up for what they'd neglected for far too many years by throwing massive amounts of military aid, equipment and money to right the wrongs in an attempt to buy back some time in the PI. In the end, it was a matter of too little and too late. RE: "On top of this The US high command feared the Filipinos would change sides and welcome the Japs as Liberators." There is a great deal of truth to this and may well be a major reason that the USAAC B-17's didn't bomb Formosa, and instead were caught on the ground by Japanese bombers and fighter planes. President Quezon seriously considered declaring neutrality in the PI, not that it would have made any difference to the invading Japanese.
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Post by johnbryan on Apr 8, 2010 13:49:49 GMT -5
i have always liked to believe that bataan and corregidor holding out as long as they did may have tipped the balance at kokoda, down in new guinea, later that summer when the nips were driving toward port moresby. maybe if they had a battalion or two more (not asking for much) their goal might have been accomplished. instead several thousand of the enemy were, till may 1942, still slogging around up on bataan and corregidor, sick, diseased and generally worn out in their attempt to beat down the amer/fil defenders. capturing port moresby would have made macarthur,s turnaround of allied fortunes much more difficult. maybe this is just a romantic view. i know some scholars feel that our prolonged resistance didnt accomplish anything but bolster the morale of the folks at home. i still gotta believe that by tying down what japanese forces were being utilized in the philippines was just enough to make the kokoda defeat of imperial forces an under appreciated victory for the "good guys". just my opinion. You are absolutely correct, Oklahoma. I just finished re-reading the Belote Brothers Book, "Corregidor" and they categorically state that the fighting on Bataan and Corregidor knocked the Japanese 4th Infantry Division right out of the war. Following the USAFFE surrender, the 4th was supposed to return to Rabaul and there to be transported to New Guinea to support the Japanese offensive there. Instead, the high battle casualty and disease rate suffered by the 4th Division, made it necessary for them to return to Japan and stand down from further fighting. The addition of an additional, battle hardened, Japanese Infantry Division might have just tipped the balance in Japan's favor in New Guinea, especially in mid-1942, when the Allies were holding on by their finger tips.
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