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Post by johnbryan on Dec 14, 2008 16:28:18 GMT -5
Okay, another interminable "what if" for you. The timeline is January-February 1942. General MacArthur's USAFFE Airforce on Luzon, Philippine Islands is down to it's last dozen aircraft. The US has promised further military aid and actually makes good on its promise.
While Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's Task Force is making diversionary hit and run raiding attacks on Japanese island bases throughout the Central Pacific with the Carriers Yorktown and Saratoga, Admiral's Halsey and Newton aboard the Carriers USS Enterprise and Lexington are making a secret resupply run of 40 US Army P-40 fighterplanes to Mindanao, PI via the southerly route and then north from Darwin, Australia. This is done in the same manner that the USS Wasp did while resupplying Malta with Spitfire fighterplanes on two occasions at about the same time.
100 miles south of Mindanao, the US Carriers launch their aircraft that will land at the USAFFE Airbase at Del Monte before being refueled, serviced and sent through to the two USAFFE Airfields on Bataan. With their Army Aircraft launched and on their way, the two carriers get the hell out of Dodge at 30+ knots and with their normal combat air patrols aloft providing security.
What effect would the welcome infusion of 40 fresh fighterplanes and pilots have on the defenders of Bataan? Sure, I know. The end results are inevitable and would only prolong the same, but what say you guys and gals?.
Would Halsey and Newton's Task Force get away scot free?. Remember, the situation throughout the whole Southwest Pacific area was fluid to say the least during this time and the Japanese would not be expecting two US Carriers to be in their back yards either
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Post by frank on Dec 15, 2008 0:42:02 GMT -5
Many Ifs. Navy torpedoes did not work properly. The Japanese torpedo's did.
IF you had aircraft OK. Then where would you get the parts and fuel? IF they had enough aircraft (transport) they perhaps could have provided support to a forward airbase. But the strategic thinkers at the Pentagon had more or less given up the Philippines even before the Japanese had attacked.
But it is a good logistics exercise.
Have a look at Gen. Lemay's Strategic Air Command of the 50s when they had the B-47s they did not have the range of the B-52s. But they would be deployed from continental US to Japan, Guam and other forward bases (Clark?). Complete with an aerial logistics train that brought fuel, bombs, part, troops and supplies.
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Post by rickthelibrarian on Feb 21, 2009 8:54:05 GMT -5
Possibly more to the point, most of the Spitfires landed at Malta on the "Wasp"'s first run were destroyed on the ground within a day or two and the "Wasp" had to make another run. I think the same thing would have happened to any U.S. planes landed on Bataan. Either that, or they would have been worn down by attrition. It was a LOT easier for the Japanese to bring in reinforcements thanthe United States.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 21, 2009 14:06:32 GMT -5
Possibly more to the point, most of the Spitfires landed at Malta on the "Wasp"'s first run were destroyed on the ground within a day or two and the "Wasp" had to make another run. I think the same thing would have happened to any U.S. planes landed on Bataan. Either that, or they would have been worn down by attrition. It was a LOT easier for the Japanese to bring in reinforcements thanthe United States. During the Bataan Campaign, US Army Engineers had already dug a number of bomb proof aircraft revetments at Bataan Airfield. They only needed the required aircraft to put into them. USAAC mechanics were experts in rebuilding shot up and heavily damaged fighterplanes, using parts of other aircraft that were much more heavily damaged. Forty brand-new P-40 E fighterplanes flown off two US Navy Carriers and sent to Mindanao, before being transferred to Luzon could have momentarily changed the balance of power on Bataan, especially during the time that the Japanese had withdrawn the majority of their aircraft and committed them to the DEI Campaign.
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 22, 2009 11:17:47 GMT -5
hey john....leave us not forget that nagumo and his deadly carriers and their air groups were still running amok during this time. even if the main body of japanese air power operating from formosa and newly captured clark field had moved on to the dutch east indies, those carriers or part of them could have lurked in bataan waters and pounded those two air strips in southern bataan into dust at their leisure methinks. those japanese navy pilots were highly skilled at their craft and probably would have made fairly short work of the USAAC guys and their P-40s if they had indeed made it to the bataan strips. an experienced pilot in a P-40 was a pretty good match for a zero pilot and his remarkable plane as was proven by the flying tigers in burma and china, but i would venture that the pilots of a force of P-40s arriving at bataan in early 1942 would be "green as grass" and would pay dearly for that lack of combat experience. also delmonte field would have suffered the same fate as the bataan airstrips if need be. nagumo and his lads had a field day in the indian ocean in the latter part of march 1942 and i gotta think he would have answered the challenge of 40 or so P-40s arriving at bataan. also did we have the fuel,etc to support such a force????these events, had they transpired, would certainly have changed the whole sequence of events as they did unfold during this time. if nagumo, or part of his force, had stayed in philippine waters, the coral sea battle would not have unfolded as it did. midway would not have taken place, at least at that time. the 4 jap carriers that were lost at midway would instead now be on the prowl with the 2 flattops that were put out of action at coral sea, instead, now present and accounted for and available when and if a midway strike was finally put into action. ah, as i have said previously, aint 20-20 hindsight and conjecture fun? its always nice talking to you. i enjoy these "what if" situations. i guess thats why i have always been so interested in military history. as i posted somewhere recently, i am still trying to figure how to get george custer out of his self inflicted predicament of june 1876. same thing with pearl harbor. i just cant get that lieutenant at the air defense filter center to take private lockwood and his buddy up at the oahu radar site seriously.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 23, 2009 22:52:54 GMT -5
My idea was for two US Aircraftcarriers to carry out raids on Japanese held islands the way they actually did, in order to draw off Japanese Aircraftcarriers while two other US Carriers made their approach into the southern Philippines and flew off their deckload of fighterplanes into Mindanao and from there, into Bataan. Doolittle managed to pull off a much greater stunt, why couldn't Halsey and Newton?
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 24, 2009 22:30:53 GMT -5
i dont doubt that it would have been possible to get the fighter aircraft to delmonte and even bataan, but what happens to them after their arrival????i honestly believe it would have been a disaster for the most part.
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Post by VeeVee on Feb 25, 2009 3:38:33 GMT -5
I think the US carrier raids were made at the fringes of Japanese held islands. The Philippines was ringed by Japanese held pacific islands with many land-based aircraft. Even without Nagumo and his carriers which I think were in having an adventure in the Indian ocean at that time, the US carriers could hardly penetrate into the Philippines steaming through seas covered and patrolled by land-based Japanese bombers from multiple directions.
With the fall of Guam and Wake island, that envelopment of Japanese air power was complete. Four precious remaining carriers did not have the critical mass to penetrate into the Philippines, unlike the 16 carrier task forces + baby carriers that steamrolled over the Japanese a few years later.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 25, 2009 14:59:24 GMT -5
I was speaking of using only two US carriers to ferry the aircraft to Mindanao, while the other two US carriers in the Pacific and their task forces were making diversionary raids far to the north to draw off Japanese aircraft carriers and aircraft in pursuit. Admiral Newton's Lexington and Halsey's Enterprise task forces would be tasked to ferry the aircraft using a southerly route north to the southern Philippines, along with a handful of supporting cruisers and destroyers. They'd go in at high speed and launch the aircraft before leaving at flank speed.
I am under no illusions about what the effect that a sudden infusion of forty fresh P-40 E Fighterplanes and their pilots into Bataan would have on the beleagured garrison, although it would undoubtedly raise the morale of the Fil-American troops through the roof. In the end, they would all go into the same bag once Bataan fell, but I'm sure that they would give a good account of themselves while sending alot more Japanese to the Yasakuni Shrine.
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 25, 2009 19:36:56 GMT -5
hey john....i know that the fil/amer forces had two (i really dont know, but seems like i have read it someplace) fighter strips on the southern tip of bataan. what i would like to know is the operational capability of these strips. 40 fighter planes would require a fairly sophisticated backup organization on the ground. maybe 20 planes remain at delmonte to be flown up as needed, if indeed, they DO make it to the PI from the carriers. even 20 P-40s would require a pretty strong ground requirement. if only 10 fighters at a time arrive to bolster the fil-amer ground forces then we are back to about our original situation for the most part. there is no doubt that it would be a tremendous morale boost, but methinks it would have been very short lived. anyhow, my main question is whether we had the capability to service that many aircraft. again, i enjoy speculating on these "what ifs".
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 25, 2009 22:53:31 GMT -5
hey john....i know that the fil/amer forces had two (i really dont know, but seems like i have read it someplace) fighter strips on the southern tip of bataan. what i would like to know is the operational capability of these strips. 40 fighter planes would require a fairly sophisticated backup organization on the ground. maybe 20 planes remain at delmonte to be flown up as needed, if indeed, they DO make it to the PI from the carriers. even 20 P-40s would require a pretty strong ground requirement. if only 10 fighters at a time arrive to bolster the fil-amer ground forces then we are back to about our original situation for the most part. there is no doubt that it would be a tremendous morale boost, but methinks it would have been very short lived. anyhow, my main question is whether we had the capability to service that many aircraft. again, i enjoy speculating on these "what ifs". One account that I read, stated that Mindanao had 3-4, brand new P-40-E Fighterplanes that had been run through the Japanese blockade by steamer ship and assembled there. They flew out of Del Monte until the surrender and were later taken into Japanese custody. While most US pilots were flown out of the PI by aircraft or taken away by submarine, the accompanying ground contingent of mechanics and armorers remained. They were later incorporated into the overall Fil-American ground forces as soldiers, because of lack of work in their former trade. Had 40 brand new US fighter planes suddenly appeared at Bataan or Cabcaben Airfields, I'm sure that the army air corps ground contingent would have been released and returned to their earlier duties.
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Post by VeeVee on Feb 26, 2009 5:27:16 GMT -5
Aviation gasoline supply was a problem too. They didn't have much that they were thinking of getting the tank group's stockpile. Their tanks used aviation gasoline. Of course the tanks were gas guzzlers and needed the gas as much as the planes.
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Post by oklahoma on Feb 26, 2009 12:55:51 GMT -5
i am wondering about aspects such as spare parts, overhaul capability, etc to service 20,30 or 40 P-40s. yes, i know we kept a handful of planes going on a shoe string, but servicing the afore mentioned number of aircraft would be quite an undertaking with what i understand was available after the bug out from clark after its decimation and evacuation. i also realize that there were enough ex-ground crew remaining on bataan to have a provisional air corps regiment serving as "grunts". the question for me is, would they have had the equipment, material, etc to perform the tasks that would be required to effectively have a group or wing size fighter operation up and running. i was stationed in korea in 1952-53 with one of these former ground crew members. he was a waist gunner on one of the destroyed B-17s at clark. with no plane remaining for him to crew in, he became an infantryman and ultimately survived the death march, hell ship voyage to japan, and a japanese coal mine to eventually marry a japanese woman while serving in the occupation prior to the outbreak of the korean war. the night before he rotated back to the states he informed all of us 18, 19, and 20 year old kids that he had placed, numerous times, in our various bunks and cots when we were passed out drunk, that he would rather be in another japanese POW camp before putting up with us kids for another year. he was kidding of course. he was a special kind of guy.
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Post by johnbryan on Feb 26, 2009 21:01:24 GMT -5
Those 40 aircraft would doubtlessly not remain 100% effective for very long. Rule of thumb in peacetime is for an average of 25% of your aircraft to be down, undergoing repairs at any one time. In wartime, that number percentage is much higher. In the book "Doomed at the Start," stories of aircraft cannibalization were rife and many of the planes that were flying out of Bataan throughout the battle had elements of several different aircraft in them, sometimes different marks of aircraft as well. The rag and bone picking mechanics there had a sizeable graveyard of irrepairable aircraft that were utilized in keeping the serviceable aircraft flying and fighting.
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