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Post by VeeVee on Dec 31, 2006 22:22:46 GMT -5
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Post by VeeVee on Jan 10, 2007 9:51:43 GMT -5
January 10th, 1942
... In the Philippines, Japanese troops attack and their
aircraft drop leaflets. One side calls upon Gen. Douglas
MacArthur to surrender. The flip side says that MacArthur has
already rejected the offer. "You are well aware you are doomed.
The end is near. The question is how long you will be able to
resist?" The Americans are grateful for the additional toilet
paper and answer the propaganda with their own heavy artillery.
MacArthur himself makes his only visit to the Bataan
peninsula that day. An artillery officer asks MacArthur if he
wants to see some 155 guns. "I don't want to see them," MacArthur
says, "I want to hear them!" The artilleryman obediently opens
fire.
MacArthur's failure to return to Bataan, however, causes
deep bitterness among his men.
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Post by VeeVee on Jan 12, 2007 12:05:38 GMT -5
January 12th, 1942 - The Japanese are stopped by the Scouts in Mabatang
From the "Fall of the Philippines" by Louis Morton
That night the Japanese in the cane field moved out against the main line of resistance. First came an artillery and mortar barrage, which was answered by concentrated fire from the 75-mm. guns of the 24th Field Artillery (PS). Hardly had the 24th opened fire than the Japanese infantry jumped off in a banzai attack across the moonlit patch of ground in front of Company I. Wave after wave of screaming Japanese troops hurled themselves forward in the face of intense fire. Men in the leading wave threw themselves on the barbed wire entanglements, forming human bridges over which succeeding waves could pass.
Despite the appalling effects of the pointblank fire from the 75's, the Japanese continued their ferocious attack until Company I, its commander seriously wounded and its executive officer killed, finally gave ground. Company K on the right immediately refused its flank and the battalion commander threw his reserve, Company L, into the fight. When this force failed to halt the Japanese, Colonel Clarke committed a company of the reserve battalion and the Japanese attack stalled. At the approach of dawn, the Scouts began a counterattack which took them almost to the original line. When the action was broken off on the morning of the 12th, there were an estimated 200 to 300 dead Japanese on the field of battle.
During the night a number of Japanese had infiltrated into the 3d Battalion area, on the left of the regimental line. The 57th Infantry spent most of the next day routing out the infiltrators, man by man, in hand-to-hand combat. After a number of Scouts had been killed, a more efficient scheme for the elimination of the infiltrated Japanese was devised. Sniper parties consisting of riflemen assisted by demolition engineers were formed and these began to comb the 3d Battalion area systematically. By the end of the day most of the Japanese had been found and killed. It was as a result of his action as the leader of one of these sniper parties that 2d Lt. Alexander R. Nininger, Jr., was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. His was the first of World War II, although Calugas received his award for heroism in the earlier fight at Layac Junction.
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Post by legionnaire on Jan 16, 2007 3:02:03 GMT -5
January 16, 1942 Morong Bataan 26th Philippine Cavalry Scout Trooper  This day the LAST GREAT Cavalry charge in US Military History. A hurriedly organized charge of a Cavalry platoon of 27 members of the 26th Philippine Scouts firing pistols from the saddles in a headlong charge against an advance guard of startled Japanese infantry and artillery in the town of Morong, Bataan . pinoyhistory.proboards22.com/index.cgi?board=photos&action=display&thread=1154062440Please include all your info of this memorable day. Philip
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Post by legionnaire on Jan 18, 2007 2:47:30 GMT -5
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Post by VeeVee on Apr 3, 2007 6:16:26 GMT -5
April 3, 1942
Sixty five years ago, April 3rd was the beginning of the end for the defenders of Bataan. One hundred ninety six Japanese artillery pieces opened up on Mt Samat and the positions occupied by the 41st Division (PA). The fire concentration was so heavy that American veterans of WWI claimed it was worse than anything they had ever received from the Germans. Japanese bombers flew with impunity and immobilized defending infantry and artillery. Whenever defending artillery fired, enemy planes immediately bombed the suspected positions. Communications were cut, natural cover and foliage were laid bare, counter-battery fires were neutralized. USAFFE artillery observation posts were rendered useless by cut telephone wires and limited visibility due to the heavy smoke and fires caused by incendiary bombs. Defenders were smoked and burned out of their positions. In the five hours that Japanese and artillery and planes pounded the area, the Philippine 41st Division was shattered. two of its three regiments obliterated.
Japanese General Nara's 65th Brigade attacked and were 1000 yards deep beyond the USAFFE defense line by nightfall. General Nara had been a classmate of General Vicente Lim at Fort Benning's Infantry School in 1928. Nara remembered Lim and liked him.
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Post by VeeVee on Apr 4, 2007 17:17:36 GMT -5
The situation at the close of April 4 was glum. In II Corps, the destruction of the 41st Division opened the terrain west of Mount Samat to the Japanese. The 21st Division had lost one full battalion, two regiments were crippled, and everyone was at or behind the deepest reserve line. One day ahead of schedule the Japanese were in a position to assault their main objective, Mount Samat, and Wainwright was starting to lose control of the battle. In his report of the day's activities, he claimed the Japanese had failed to gain any ground. (from Bataan, Our Last Ditch)
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Post by VeeVee on Apr 5, 2007 6:32:08 GMT -5
April 5
At first light, Japanese artillery fired a pre-assault barrage, catching some soldiers attending Easter services. Fifty six light bombers and eighty one heavy bombers savaged Filipinos around Mt. Samat. The Japanese were confident because there had been so few losses and little determined resistance. Unexpectedly and to the surprise of both Japanese and Filipinos, the morning attack floundered.The 21st Divisions's right flank, bolstered by two battalions of the 41st Artillery firing from Mt Samat's southern slopes offered strong resistance. Filipino artillerymen stood fast and battered the Japanese. The impacting artillery repeatedly broke up enemy concentrations, disorganized the assault force and pinned the Japanese short of their objective on Trail 4. Additional artillery fired rolled in from Mt. Capot and Mt. Orion, fires so effective that Col. Hiromi Oishi decribed Filipino efforts here as "the fiercest combat of the second Bataan campaign." Dodging exploding shells, Japanese leaders urged their men forward in the belief that the loss of Mt. Samat would collapse Filipino resistance.
They were correct,. The Japanese of the less-harrassed right wing were not to be denied. They started a steady exhausting climb up Mt. Samat and threatened the hard-firing artillery. Few Filipino infantrymen opposed them, for the 41st Division had disintegrated two days earlier, and efforts to throw a line in front of Mt. Samat with 21st Division soldiers had failed. All too soon, Captain Jones of the 41st Artillery reported one of his batteries was under attack and begged the 21st Division for help. Before Gen. Capinpin's men could organize a relief effort, firing increased around the artillerymen. A platoon of the 21st Division atop Mt. Samat reported the Japanese were rushing their position. Then communications with the artillery were lost.
...Some batteries continued to fire until charged and captured. In other units, artillerymen pushed their canon over cliffs, destroyed equipment, and tried to make their way south. By 1630 hours, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 41st Artillery were in full flight. Filipino fires that had been holding the Japanese in check and encouraging Filipino infantry stuttered to a hault.
...Relieved of the galling Filipino fire, the Japanese left wing resumed its advance and forced the faltering 21st Division to retreat. The right wing continued down the southern slopes and at 1630 hours fell upon the 21st Division command post, completely surprising the occupants and routing the Filipinos.
General Capinpin evaded the Japanese in the first few minutes... but was captured at some point while moving his command post to a new location.
Wainwright visited Bataan on this day and planned a counterattack with the commanding generals. When he returned to Corregidor, he sent this message to MacArthur:
The troops have been on half rations for 3 months and are now on less than that amount which results in much loss of physical vigor and sickness.Nevertheless before allowing a capitulation the operation you suggest will be adopted. I hope however that supplies will arrive in good time. Enemy has been very active on front of Second Corps for past two days with resultant loss of a little ground on our part. Situation still serious if not alarming. I counter attack tomorrow.
(source: Bataan, Our Last Ditch)
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Post by VeeVee on Apr 7, 2007 17:15:58 GMT -5
April 6
On April 6, the Americans and Filipinos staged a last ditch counterattack but it failed and units' missions turned defensive.
All reserve units that could be called forward had been ordered into battle including engineer units and the horseless 26th cavalry.
The Japanese were triumphant as April 6 closed. Gen. Homma's army had destroyed two division, the 21st and 41st, and one regiment, the 51st. Homma had also cut off two regiments from the main area of interest, the 41st and 45th Infantry, and isolated Sector D headquarters from its troops. The soldiers manning the San Vicente river line were disorganized and demoralized. Mentally, they were already defeated and were only waiting for the event to be confirmed. The left flank of II Corps was smashed, the two corps split apart, Mount Samat lost, defending artillery all but neutralized, and the rear of Parker's II Corps invitingly open to Japanese exploitation. The chaos in in II Corps was so bad that General Parker's headquarters did not fully understand the situation. When a Corps staff officer reached the 31st Infantry on the San Vicente river this night, he realized that II Corps headquarters knew nothing about status of the withdrawal to the river.
(source: Bataan, Our Last Ditch)
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Post by VeeVee on Apr 7, 2007 23:33:11 GMT -5
April 7
By the early morning hours of April 9 all reserves of II Corps, Luzon Force, and I Corps were committed. There was nothing left with which anyone could influence the battle. The entire Bataan army was engaged. The situation had passed the critical stage and was now terminal -- it was only a question of how long the death throes would last.
... II Corps artillery displaced its remaining guns to the rear. The hospitals were jammed. The army's supply organizations folded. Transportation units, without orders, abandoned their motor pools and headed west and south. Various combat units were lost, separated, scattered, left behind enemy lines, and in retreat.
Still believing that the American reserve line lay near Mamala River, the Japanese were pleasantly surprised when they forced its evacuation without a fight. "This was beyond our expectations," remembered General Homma. Instead of taking a break at the Mamala, as originally planned, the Japanese designated Cabcaben on the southeast tip of the peninsula as the next objective.
(source: Bataan, Our Last Ditch)
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Post by VeeVee on Apr 7, 2007 23:47:46 GMT -5
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Post by VeeVee on May 6, 2007 8:59:48 GMT -5
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