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Post by johnbryan on Mar 4, 2010 0:07:02 GMT -5
What if the sub tender USS Canopus, rather than be scuttled in deep water after the final Japanese breakthrough on Battaan, was instead loaded up with all of the remaining USN food supplies, priceless equipment, machinery, tools, arms, ammunition and manpower, before sailing across the bay to Corregidor, to be unloaded there? Perhaps she could have taken several M-3 Stuart tanks aboard, as well as a number of Army, 3-inch flak guns, before she departed Maraveles.
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Post by VeeVee on Mar 4, 2010 20:21:35 GMT -5
If I remember correctly, the Canopus was not seaworthy anymore at that time. It was operational but beached or partially sunk and unseaworthy. It would have been good to have those supplies transferred but even one the most important items ordered withdrawn to Corregidor didn't make it to the docks because of the traffic jams... the 45th Infantry Philippine Scouts.
The tanks wouldn't be able to get on the Canopus anyhow... they probably would need cranes to lift them up and down into the ship assuming there is open deck space for it. They were too far gone and engaged by enemy action to withdraw to the docks anyway.
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Post by oklahoma on Mar 4, 2010 20:52:07 GMT -5
Hey John....I love these "what ifs" that you throw out at us Corregidor/Bataan "geeks". As to this particular question, I would think that it surely would have enabled the Corregidor defenders to prolong their agony for an undetermined length of time before the enevitable. Methinks, that a few Stuart tanks could have very well handled those two Jap monstrosities and the captured Stuart the enemy landed on Corregidor's north shore. The Stuarts handled the enemy armor in good fashion at Plaridel during the withdrawal to Bataan. That delaying action at the aforemention road junction was key in allowing II Corps to sideslip into the peninsula. I am confident that the Japanese tanks would have been short lived on the "rock". This alone would have caused Skinny Wainwright to prolong the resistance, you would think. It was the information reaching HQ in Malinta that "tanks were on the island" that colored the thinking of the US brass. This information didn't state how many, but just the idea that some of those little, squat, obsolete tanks pushing into crowded Malinta Tunnel was enough to force Johnathan Wainwright to prematurely request a cease fire and a trip to Bataan to parley with Genl Homma. I think we all agree that the final result would have been the same, maybe bloodier,etc, but we certainly would have been in a much healthier defensive stance with just a few of those remaining Stuarts. Whatcha think? ? I have always thought, even without any armor of our own on Corregidor, that some means could have been found to knock out those three Japanese armored units. By use of land mines (maybe we had none, probably we didnt) dynamite, molotov cocktails,etc. any method that could have knocked the tracks or treads off their sprockets and those dudes would be sitting ducks. If the eastern entrance to Malinta could have been heavily defended and those narrow roads around the north and south hillsides of Malinta Hill demolished by TNT or dynamite the defenders would have been in a formidable defensive posture. Of course, the Jap batteries would have made the Amer/Fil troops on the north side of Malinta, defending the narrow passage there, rather exposed, but our forces had plenty of small arms ammo and had the Japanese forces greatly outnumbered. I have always wondered just how many able bodied troops on Topside never were utilized. I know that they were trained in Coast Artillery, but they all had .03 rifles, machine guns, etc and at least knew how to pull a trigger. We were in such a better military situation and didn't realize it. I will say again, the ultimate outcome would have been the same, but probably a few weeks (or more) in the future. Nipponese troops that could have been utilized in New Guinea and the Solomons would have been tied down for a longer period of time. I have long believed that had the Japanese had one more regiment or even another battalion or two more at Kokoda Pass down in New Guinea later that summer, Port Moresby would have fallen and that whole southern campaign would have shook out in a far different manner. We would'nt have had a base on that large island to mount our slogging trip back to the PI. Ain't hind sight great?
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Post by oklahoma on Mar 5, 2010 9:27:06 GMT -5
Hey Vic and John....After sending my first reply I started wondering if the water was deep enough on the south side of Corregidor for the Canopus to dock and unload, if, as Vic says docking facilities were available. If the unloading had to take place on the north side where there were more dockage space, cranes,etc, the Japs might have gotten their batteries in place soon enough to cut the ship to pieces before the process was completed. I am in full agreement about the 45th Philippine Scout Regiment's absence being critical. I betcha had they been present there wouldn't have been a premature surrender. Those guys were well trained, armed, disciplined, combat experienced troops. We had the invaders outnumbered as it was and having the Scouts, the best troops in the campaign in my humble, would have cinched the deal as far as repelling that first Japanese invasion attempt. Sure, the final outcome was a "done deal", but you can rest assured that had the 45th been on Corregidor, the "done deal" wouldn't have been "done" that day. I will always believe that to be true.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 5, 2010 12:24:27 GMT -5
If I remember correctly, the Canopus was not seaworthy anymore at that time. It was operational but beached or partially sunk and unseaworthy. It would have been good to have those supplies transferred but even one the most important items ordered withdrawn to Corregidor didn't make it to the docks because of the traffic jams... the 45th Infantry Philippine Scouts. The tanks wouldn't be able to get on the Canopus anyhow... they probably would need cranes to lift them up and down into the ship assuming there is open deck space for it. They were too far gone and engaged by enemy action to withdraw to the docks anyway. While the Canopus had suffered some bomb damage and was no longer seaworthy, her list was artificially induced to fool Japanese reconnaissance aircraft into believing that she was sunk. She could still manuever under her own power and did so on her final voyage. The Canopus also possessed heavy lift, ship board cranes. Remember, she had to have everything necessary aboard to service her brood of submarines. I would think lifting two or three M-3 Stuart tanks aboard would be within the realm of possibility. I would also think that a ship's hold filled with navy issue, canned foodstuffs, a workshop filled with heavy and precision machinery, a battalion or two of Philippine Scouts, a couple Stuart tanks and thousands of gallons of diesel and bunker fuel would be warmly received by the garrison on Corregidor.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 5, 2010 12:31:11 GMT -5
Hey Vic and John....After sending my first reply I started wondering if the water was deep enough on the south side of Corregidor for the Canopus to dock and unload, if, as Vic says docking facilities were available. If the unloading had to take place on the north side where there were more dockage space, cranes,etc, the Japs might have gotten their batteries in place soon enough to cut the ship to pieces before the process was completed. I am in full agreement about the 45th Philippine Scout Regiment's absence being critical. I betcha had they been present there wouldn't have been a premature surrender. Those guys were well trained, armed, disciplined, combat experienced troops. We had the invaders outnumbered as it was and having the Scouts, the best troops in the campaign in my humble, would have cinched the deal as far as repelling that first Japanese invasion attempt. Sure, the final outcome was a "done deal", but you can rest assured that had the 45th been on Corregidor, the "done deal" wouldn't have been "done" that day. I will always believe that to be true. I think there would have been sufficient time to unload the Canopus at North Dock on Corregidor of her precious cargo and strip her down to the bare bulkheads before scuttling her in deep water as was historically done, before the Japanese could emplace enough artillery batteries to effectively bring her under fire.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 5, 2010 12:55:31 GMT -5
Hey John....I love these "what ifs" that you throw out at us Corregidor/Bataan "geeks". As to this particular question, I would think that it surely would have enabled the Corregidor defenders to prolong their agony for an undetermined length of time before the enevitable. Methinks, that a few Stuart tanks could have very well handled those two Jap monstrosities and the captured Stuart the enemy landed on Corregidor's north shore. The Stuarts handled the enemy armor in good fashion at Plaridel during the withdrawal to Bataan. That delaying action at the aforemention road junction was key in allowing II Corps to sideslip into the peninsula. I am confident that the Japanese tanks would have been short lived on the "rock". This alone would have caused Skinny Wainwright to prolong the resistance, you would think. It was the information reaching HQ in Malinta that "tanks were on the island" that colored the thinking of the US brass. This information didn't state how many, but just the idea that some of those little, squat, obsolete tanks pushing into crowded Malinta Tunnel was enough to force Johnathan Wainwright to prematurely request a cease fire and a trip to Bataan to parley with Genl Homma. I think we all agree that the final result would have been the sa me, maybe bloodier,etc, but we certainly would have been in a much healthier defensive stance with just a few of those remaining Stuarts. Whatcha think? ? I have always thought, even without any armor of our own on Corregidor, that some means could have been found to knock out those three Japanese armored units. By use of land mines (maybe we had none, probably we didnt) dynamite, molotov thingytails,etc. any method that could have knocked the tracks or treads off their sprockets and those dudes would be sitting ducks. If the eastern entrance to Malinta could have been heavily defended and those narrow roads around the north and south hillsides of Malinta Hill demolished by TNT or dynamite the defenders would have been in a formidable defensive posture. Of course, the Jap batteries would have made the Amer/Fil troops on the north side of Malinta, defending the narrow passage there, rather exposed, but our forces had plenty of small arms ammo and had the Japanese forces greatly outnumbered. I have always wondered just how many able bodied troops on Topside never were utilized. I know that they were trained in Coast Artillery, but they all had .03 rifles, machine guns, etc and at least knew how to pull a trigger. We were in such a better military situation and didn't realize it. I will say again, the ultimate outcome would have been the same, but probably a few weeks (or more) in the future. Nipponese troops that could have been utilized in New Guinea and the Solomons would have been tied down for a longer period of time. I have long believed that had the Japanese had one more regiment or even another battalion or two more at Kokoda Pass down in New Guinea later that summer, Port Moresby would have fallen and that whole southern campaign would have shook out in a far different manner. We would'nt have had a base on that large island to mount our slogging trip back to the PI. Ain't hind sight great? I think it was Ray Lawrence who said he believed there were fewer that 500 combat effective Japanese troops left on Corregidor at the time of the surrender and that things were comparatively quiet in his sector at the tail end of the island. There also were only 21 undamaged Japanese landing craft remaining, so their plans to land the remainder of 4th Division at Topside that night would have met with some seriouis resistance by the Marines and Army troops already dug in there, because the Japanese would have difficulty bringing the remaining troops ashore in one wave.. As it was, the fighting on Bataan and Corregidor effectively knocked the Japanese 4th Division out of the war for the duration because of all the combat and disease casualties suffered there. After the fighting on Bataan and Corregidor, they were reduced to but a cadre of their former self.
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Post by oklahoma on Mar 5, 2010 16:36:45 GMT -5
Hey John....Was it Lt Lawrence who said that after the Japanese got their foothold out on the tail of the island and turned west toward water tank hill and the Malinta area their backs were to the Amer/Fil troops on the eastern tip of the "rock" and were dangerously exposed. Had the defenders been maybe better led and equipped the Nipponese might have been caught with their "whatchacallit in a ringer" seeing as how our guys were in their front and rear. I have heard or read someplace that Genl Homma, had his assault failed, was prepared to wait it out for an extended time hoping for attrition to take a toll before mounting another amphibious landing. This type tactic, of course goes against every thing the Japanese Army believed in. No BANZAI philosophy here, but they were literally out of barges,etc. Suitable landing craft was never a Japanese strong suit during those early days of the war as I understand it and they were woefully short of what they did have. They were sucessful in all those early landings because the defenders were never really dug in on the beaches. You can make unopposed landings in bass boats when the shoreline is clear of wire, mines, and dug in machine guns and artillery. Corregidor had to be the toughest obstacle Japanese landing parties faced in the entire 1941-42 early Pacific offensive. They literally walked ashore at Singapore, all the Dutch East Indies landings, Hong Kong Island, Malaya, New Guinea, New Britain and the rest of the Solomons. Like Vic has stated, the presence of the 45th Philippine Scout Regiment would have tested the resolve of the Emperor's forces, methinks. I say again, "ain't hindsight great" ? Always great talking and conjecturing with you. You obviously know your stuff when it comes to military history,etc. Cheers.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 5, 2010 20:05:25 GMT -5
Hey John....Was it Lt Lawrence who said that after the Japanese got their foothold out on the tail of the island and turned west toward water tank hill and the Malinta area their backs were to the Amer/Fil troops on the eastern tip of the "rock" and were dangerously exposed. Had the defenders been maybe better led and equipped the Nipponese might have been caught with their "whatchacallit in a ringer" seeing as how our guys were in their front and rear. I have heard or read someplace that Genl Homma, had his assault failed, was prepared to wait it out for an extended time hoping for attrition to take a toll before mounting another amphibious landing. This type tactic, of course goes against every thing the Japanese Army believed in. No BANZAI philosophy here, but they were literally out of barges,etc. Suitable landing craft was never a Japanese strong suit during those early days of the war as I understand it and they were woefully short of what they did have. They were sucessful in all those early landings because the defenders were never really dug in on the beaches. You can make unopposed landings in bass boats when the shoreline is clear of wire, mines, and dug in machine guns and artillery. Corregidor had to be the toughest obstacle Japanese landing parties faced in the entire 1941-42 early Pacific offensive. They literally walked ashore at Singapore, all the Dutch East Indies landings, Hong Kong Island, Malaya, New Guinea, New Britain and the rest of the Solomons. Like Vic has stated, the presence of the 45th Philippine Scout Regiment would have tested the resolve of the Emperor's forces, methinks. I say again, "ain't hindsight great" ? Always great talking and conjecturing with you. You obviously know your stuff when it comes to military history,etc. Cheers. Agreed! I feel the same about you too, Oklahoma!
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 5, 2010 20:11:14 GMT -5
I just opened the Belote Brothers Book and found the Japanese, after initially losing so many landing craft, cancelled their planned night landing on Topside. Instead, they intended on landing on the same beaches as the night before. Perhaps the remaining Americans on the tail of the island could whittle down the numbers of Japanese landing craft even more with their remaining artillery. It is said that General Homma was on the verge of committing Sepuku. Perhaps him losing more men and additional landing craft could push him over the edge.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 5, 2010 23:16:51 GMT -5
Unfortunately, Lt. Lawrence only had 82 men under his immediate command, so he didn't have alot of fighting men to commit to any counterattack on the Japanese invaders. He probably had his hands full in just holding onto the defense positions that he and his men occupied.
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Post by oklahoma on Mar 6, 2010 9:45:05 GMT -5
Hey John....Every time I pick up that Belote book (and others) I find myself hoping that somehow there is a different, more favorable ending. I do the same thing with anything on the Alamo, Wake Island, Singapore, the Little Big Horn, "Task Force Smith" in Korea but, alas, it is always the same. Defeat. There is just something about "last stands" that grab hold of me. As I said in a post a couple of years ago, I am still waiting for a US Naval task force with the USS Enterprise and Yorktown to steam around the Batangas headlands just in the nick of time to save the "rock", but it aint gonna happen, it seems.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 6, 2010 21:26:39 GMT -5
Hey John....Every time I pick up that Belote book (and others) I find myself hoping that somehow there is a different, more favorable ending. I do the same thing with anything on the Alamo, Wake Island, Singapore, the Little Big Horn, "Task Force Smith" in Korea but, alas, it is always the same. Defeat. There is just something about "last stands" that grab hold of me. As I said in a post a couple of years ago, I am still waiting for a US Naval task force with the USS Enterprise and Yorktown to steam around the Batangas headlands just in the nick of time to save the "rock", but it aint gonna happen, it seems. I know what you mean. I've often had dreams where I'm General Custer and instead of following orders, I tell Benteen and Reno to stay with the main body of the 7th Cavalry until we can find out the true size of this "Big Village" that's somewhere out in the distance. In the case of Singapore. I wish the British had an immaginative artillery officer like our Paul Bunker on Corregidor. It was through his intimate knowledge of all things artillery, that American armorers were able to convert 12" armor piercing rounds into instantaneous bursting, high explosive, rounds by removing the 0.05 delay pellet from the armor piercing rounds. Unlike much of what has been historically written about the Siege of Singapore, the British heavy artillery could be directed against the invading Japanese coming from behind their artillery positions. The problem was in the lack of high exposive instantaneously bursting rounds.
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Post by oklahoma on Mar 7, 2010 12:13:42 GMT -5
Hey John....You are so correct in stating that much of the British artillery was not emplaced just for firing seward. I am ashamed to admit it, but I only learned about 10 years ago that many of Genl Percival's heavy guns could, indeed, be fired toward Genl Yama$hita's invaders coming down from the north. You would think that considerable damage could have been done to the invaders massing on the north side of the Straits of Johore prior to shoving off for Singapore Island. Somewhere, years ago, I read an account that prior to Singapore's capitulation that Churchill was approached, by who I do not remember, about the possibility of throwing in the towel somewhat sooner than actually happened. The Prime minister supposedly hit the ceiling and inquired how in hell could such an idea be bantered around when the American and Filipino forces were holding out on Bataan in what seemed to be a much more stubborn fashion and with less resources. I am sure you have read or heard this little story. With hindsight, it would, indeed, seem that the USAFFE forces did, even with the many snafus in the early days prior to the withdrawal to the peninsula, inflict more punishment on the invaders than did the forces under General Percival. The Japanese amphibious "end runs" worked well for them in Malaya, whereas, during the Bataan Campaign, the landings behind the MLR were contained and destroyed as you well know. The allied forces involved in the Malayan Campaign seemed even more cursed than did those in the Philippines. It is ironic to me that the "Tiger of Malaya's" forces were also in a rather precarious situation as regards ammo, supplies,etc once they were on the island of Singapore than General Percival realized. Kinda like the situation on Corregidor, (and Wake Island) wouldn't you say?
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 8, 2010 23:05:52 GMT -5
Hey John....You are so correct in stating that much of the British artillery was not emplaced just for firing seward. I am ashamed to admit it, but I only learned about 10 years ago that many of Genl Percival's heavy guns could, indeed, be fired toward Genl Yama$hita's invaders coming down from the north. You would think that considerable damage could have been done to the invaders massing on the north side of the Straits of Johore prior to shoving off for Singapore Island. Somewhere, years ago, I read an account that prior to Singapore's capitulation that Churchill was approached, by who I do not remember, about the possibility of throwing in the towel somewhat sooner than actually happened. The Prime minister supposedly hit the ceiling and inquired how in hell could such an idea be bantered around when the American and Filipino forces were holding out on Bataan in what seemed to be a much more stubborn fashion and with less resources. I am sure you have read or heard this little story. With hindsight, it would, indeed, seem that the USAFFE forces did, even with the many snafus in the early days prior to the withdrawal to the peninsula, inflict more punishment on the invaders than did the forces under General Percival. The Japanese amphibious "end runs" worked well for them in Malaya, whereas, during the Bataan Campaign, the landings behind the MLR were contained and destroyed as you well know. The allied forces involved in the Malayan Campaign seemed even more cursed than did those in the Philippines. It is ironic to me that the "Tiger of Malaya's" forces were also in a rather precarious situation as regards ammo, supplies,etc once they were on the island of Singapore than General Percival realized. Kinda like the situation on Corregidor, (and Wake Island) wouldn't you say? One of the many sad things about the Singapore Campaign, besides its early surrender, was there were alot of fresh Commonwealth troops who never fired a shot in anger, that had recently arrived. Had I been Percival, I would have laid down an ultra-heavy artillery bombardment onto the Japanese positions before sending in those fresh troops with fixed bayonets. If the Japanese were truly running low on ammunition, they wouldn't have remained in their positions for very long.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 8, 2010 23:11:00 GMT -5
Another very important thing that was overlooked. The British should have sent a true, bastard "warrior general" to Malaya to forceably shake the British people there out of their peacetime complacency and get the civilian population and soldiers alike away from their Puka-Sahib mindset and prepare them for a real war with Japan.
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Post by oklahoma on Mar 9, 2010 10:56:58 GMT -5
Hey John....Your last post, I think, sums up the whole Singapore campaign up. It seems as if the whole thing from the landings at Singora,etc to the surrender at the Singapore Ford Motor facility was sluggish, unimaginative, sloppily handled. Methinks, it would be safe to say that our guys, after almost criminal decision making by USAFFE Headquarters in the early days, aquitted themselves very well after settling down at the Abucay Line and especially after retiring to the second line of defense. In short we bloodied more Japanese noses than did the Brits. I think this is especially true when our supply situation, i.e, medicine, food, etc is taken into consideration. Taking nothing away from the British conduct of the total war effort, the Singapore campaign left much to be desired. If Winston Churchill proclaimed this blatant fact, I think it is appropriate for amateur military historians/buffs such as you and me to say the same thing. In no way, do I think that General Percival was the guy for the job. In fairness, I suppose the British felt that their best Commanders should be fighting the Germans. Maybe that "one American can whip 10 Japs" mindset also infected our Ally's thinking in regard to the Far East. For example....One battleship (Prince of Wales) and one Battle crusier (Repulse) might be enough to bluff the Imperial Japanese Navy from moving too far south from Indo China. The British and American had hard lessons to learn in those early days. Methinks, we began our learning process early on. Not so much so for the British. Malaya, Burma and Singapore were brutal class rooms. The Australians were excellent later in New Guinea and the British came on strong in 1944-45 in repelling the Japs at the gates to India at Imphal and the retaking of Burma. Tragic that the Brit General Slim, running that late show, wasn't on the scene in 1941-42. He might not have made a difference in the final outcome, but it certainly, in my view, could have prolonged the fight. If Churchill felt that the Singapore tent "folded prematurely", that's good enough for me. I guess that we have wandered far afield from Philippine topics, but I betcha Vic won't object too much. After all we are comparing the resistance of USAFFE to that of our allies in a very dismal period of the Pacific War. Cheers.
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Post by johnbryan on Mar 10, 2010 12:07:58 GMT -5
Hey John....Your last post, I think, sums up the whole Singapore campaign up. It seems as if the whole thing from the landings at Singora,etc to the surrender at the Singapore Ford Motor facility was sluggish, unimaginative, sloppily handled. Methinks, it would be safe to say that our guys, after almost criminal decision making by USAFFE Headquarters in the early days, aquitted themselves very well after settling down at the Abucay Line and especially after retiring to the second line of defense. In short we bloodied more Japanese noses than did the Brits. I think this is especially true when our supply situation, i.e, medicine, food, etc is taken into consideration. Taking nothing away from the British conduct of the total war effort, the Singapore campaign left much to be desired. If Winston Churchill proclaimed this blatant fact, I think it is appropriate for amateur military historians/buffs such as you and me to say the same thing. In no way, do I think that General Percival was the guy for the job. In fairness, I suppose the British felt that their best Commanders should be fighting the Germans. Maybe that "one American can whip 10 Japs" mindset also infected our Ally's thinking in regard to the Far East. For example....One battleship (Prince of Wales) and one Battle crusier (Repulse) might be enough to bluff the Imperial Japanese Navy from moving too far south from Indo China. The British and American had hard lessons to learn in those early days. Methinks, we began our learning process early on. Not so much so for the British. Malaya, Burma and Singapore were brutal class rooms. The Australians were excellent later in New Guinea and the British came on strong in 1944-45 in repelling the Japs at the gates to India at Imphal and the retaking of Burma. Tragic that the Brit General Slim, running that late show, wasn't on the scene in 1941-42. He might not have made a difference in the final outcome, but it certainly, in my view, could have prolonged the fight. If Churchill felt that the Singapore tent "folded prematurely", that's good enough for me. I guess that we have wandered far afield from Philippine topics, but I betcha Vic won't object too much. After all we are comparing the resistance of USAFFE to that of our allies in a very dismal period of the Pacific War. Cheers. I agree. Bill Slim would have been my first choice also to command the Commonwealth Forces in Malaya. Judging from his overall leadership abilities and actions during the long retreat from Burma in 1942, if anyone could have forged the fighting spirit and put the heart of a warrior into the garrison troops at Singapore, it would have been Field Marshal Viscount Slim.
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